conjectural variation model indicates the possibility of a decline in the degree of competition.
I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the 1997-98 East Asian crisis and the subsequent reforms affected the degree of competition in the Thai banking industry. Through the reforms, the industry has undergone substantial changes in terms of the ownership of banks and of regulations. In many banks, family ownership has been replaced by state and foreign ownership. The banking sector saw several entrants during the reforms, a phenomenon that had been absent for more than twenty years before the crisis. Despite these developments, a casual observation of loan market share suggests that the oligopolistic nature of the industry remains unchanged.
1 Before as well as after the crisis, the six largest banks accounted for 70 per cent of total loans of the consolidated banking sector. The rather stable market share of the large banks, despite the reforms, forms the background of the present analysis on the behaviour of leading Thai banks.
To estimate the degree of competition, we apply the method devised by Bresnahan (1989) . Using estimation models based on microeconomic foundations, this method allows us to derive the index of the firms' market power that is calculated as the deviation of the market price from the marginal cost. Several studies have applied this method to the analysis of the banking industry, and these have often found that banking industries cannot be regarded as being in perfect competition. One of the earliest studies is that of Shaffer (1993) on the Canadian banking industry. She used time series data for the aggregated banking sector, and estimated an average degree of competition over a long period of time.
2 Bikker and Haaf (2002) applied the same method to the banking industries of the European countries. While the estimation based on time series data yields only an average degree of competition for a long period, panel data from the financial statements of individual banks allows us to estimate the industry-wide average degree of competition and to evaluate its year-by-year evolution. The latter method has been applied by Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) to the Italian banks, and by Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) to the Japanese banks.
3 Our study also employs panel data in our case data relating to the Thai commercial banks during the period 1992-2004. By estimating parameters of a market power index for consecutive years before and after the crisis, we evaluate the year-by-year evolution of the degree of competition.
The present paper contributes to the empirical literature on the Thai banking sector. Among existing studies, in contrast to the abundant literature that outlines the financial reform measures that followed the 1997-98 East Asian crisis, 4 there are relatively few quantitative analyses of the structural changes that have occurred in the banking industry. Among the few existing studies, Anuchiworawong, Souma, and Wiwattanakantang (2003) and Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2005) describe the decline of family ownership of banks from the perspective of corporate governance. In their study relating to foreign bank penetration through the reforms, Okuda and Rungsomboon (2004b) analyse the effects of foreign bank entry on the banking industry, and find that an increased presence of foreign banks in terms of number of banks is associated with a rise in overhead costs, a decline in profits, and an increase in the interest spread of local banks.
5 In contrast to the narrow focus of Okuda and Rungsomboon (2004b) on the effects of foreign bank entries, we consider the effects of the reforms, including changes in the ownership structure, on the degree of competition. The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe changes in the Thai banking industry during the crisis and reforms that might affect the degree of competition. We present our econometric model in section III, and discuss the results of estimation in section IV. In section V, we summarize the analysis and offer some concluding remarks.
II. Changes in the Competitive Environment of the Thai Banking Industry
In January 2004, the Thai government announced the Financial Sector Master Plan, which signalled the banking industry's return to normal from a post-crisis mode. The visions of the plan are threefold: (1) to broaden general access to financial services, especially for rural and lowincome households; (2) to increase efficiency of the financial sector; and (3) to protect consumers by promoting information disclosure of financial institutions and introducing a deposit insurance. The substantial part of the plan addresses measures to increase efficiency of the financial sector through enhancing market mechanism. These include: (i) relaxing entry to the banking sector by promoting upgrade of finance or credit foncier companies to commercial banks; (ii) relaxing regulations on opening branches in dense areas; and (iii) relaxing restrictions on foreign financial institutions' scope of business and opening branches. The plan appears to reflect the financial authorities' perception that the banking industry still requires more competition to improve efficiency. Therefore, an evaluation of the degree of competition in the banking industry would contribute to assessing the exigency of the plan. Before proceeding to empirical analysis, we describe the development of the banking industry with special reference to the competitive environment during the crisis and reform periods.
II.1 Structure of the Financial Sector
The financial sector in Thailand mainly consists of commercial banks, finance companies, and government-owned specialized financial institutions. Commercial banks comprise banks incorporated in Thailand and branches of foreign banks. At the end of 2004, there were 3,911 branches of locally incorporated banks, while each of the eighteen foreign banks has been allowed to open one branch within Thailand. Finance companies are not permitted to accept deposits, and they raise funds by issuing debt instruments instead. Government-owned specialized financial institutions include the Government Savings Bank, the Government Housing Bank, and the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives. Apart from the above financial institutions, there are savings co-operatives and agricultural cooperatives. The average size of these co-operatives and their aggregated share in the financial sector are small. Table 1 summarizes the size of the respective categories of financial institutions. Table 1 shows that the high concentration of market share by the six largest local banks remains a salient feature of the Thai financial sector. The total loans of these banks account for about a half of the whole financial sector before as well as after the East Asian crisis. Before the crisis, their share at one time declined because of a surge in the loans of the finance companies. The lending practices of most of these finance companies were reportedly bold, and fifty-six finance companies were closed and liquidated in 1997 due to a severe non-performing loans (NPLs) problem. In the subsequent financial restructuring period, the share of large commercial banks has been relatively low as their loan assets declined sharply as a result of NPLs. As the restructuring settled down, their share picked up. This was partially because some leading banks merged or succeeded to the viable assets of closed smaller banks and finance companies. On balance, the banking industry remained more or less oligopolistic.
II.2 Changes in the Competitive Environment
We can observe two changes in the competitive environment that might have affected the degree of competition in the banking industry. First, there were significant changes in the ownership structure of financial institutions during the reforms. The government not only nationalized and liquidated a number of distressed banks, but also abolished the restriction on the foreign ownership of commercial banks in order to invite foreign banks and investors to recapitalize the distressed banks. Hitherto, foreign ownership had been restricted to less than 25 per cent of the equity capital of each financial institution, and it was this regulation that was lifted for a specified period. As a result, foreign banks now own majority shares in four small and medium banks. As of 1996, founding families were the largest shareholders in five of the eight largest banks. By 2003, foreign investors were the largest shareholders in two banks, including the largest one. Two other banks have been either nationalized or liquidated, and there remains only one bank in which the largest shareholder is the founding family (Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang 2005) .
Second, there has also been a significant change in the attitudes of the financial authorities towards entry into the banking sector. There had been no new entry and only one exit between 1980 and 1996, whereas five banks exited through liquidations and mergers during the recent reforms, and two stateowned banks were established to succeed to part of the assets and liabilities of the closed banks. Furthermore, a private finance company was upgraded to commercial bank status in 2004 by the issuance of a brand-new banking licence, the first such initiative in the last two decades.
Such changes in ownership structure as well as entry and exit in the industry may affect the degree of competition. In practical terms, these changes may make it difficult to maintain collusion, if any, between banks, and this in turn might well lead to an intensification of competition within the industry.
II.3 Changes in the Performance of Banks
In order to analyse the degree of competition ,659,760 57.1 3,086,243 44.7 2,597,864 43.6 3,607,270 54.7 of which foreign bank branches 111,639 3.8 376,992 5.5 467,387 7.8 454,164 ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ among banks, we have to take into account changes in their performance as well as in the structure of their revenues and expenses. First, there has been a notable fluctuation in the profitability of the banks. In Figure 1 , we present a summary of selected indices concerning the performance of the banking industry using data compiled from the income statements of the consolidated commercial banks in Thailand (excluding branches of foreign banks). One of the reasons for the fluctuation in profitability is the problem of NPLs. The ratio of NPLs to total loans rose to around 45 per cent in 1999. The NPLs problem lowered profitability in two ways. First, the banks incurred huge expenses in the form of loan loss provisions for the disposal of NPLs (depicted as the dotted line in Figure 1 ). Moreover, NPLs, either classified or non-classified, reduced interest income from these assets, thus bringing about an abrupt decline in net interest income in 1998 (depicted as the fine continuous line in Figure 1 ). It was not until 2001 that the net profits of the banks became positive again. Changes in interest rates have also been remarkable. Figure 2 illustrates lending and deposit interest rates and the interest margin between the two rates. While both the lending and deposit interest rates fell considerably in the reform process, the spread widened to more than 4 per cent in the 2000s from around 3 per cent before the crisis. This widening margin partially accounts for the rising net interest income in recent years (see Figure 1) .
Changes are also apparent in both revenue and cost structures. Figure 3 portrays the structure of revenues and expenses as a percentage of total assets for the consolidated commercial banks (excluding branches of foreign banks). So far as the changes in the structure of revenues are concerned, we can see a sharp drop in "interests 1989M9 1990M5 1991M1 1991M9 1992M5 1993M1 1993M9 1994M5 1995M1 1995M9 1996M5 1997M1 1997M9 1998M5 1999M1 1999M9 2000M5 2001M1 2001M9 2002M5 2003M1 2003M9 2004M5 Lending Rate
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Interest margin on loans and deposits" 7 in 1999, which corresponds with the decline in the lending interest rate (see also Figure 2 ). Another significant change is the increase in "other interests and dividends revenue" after 1998. In particular, there was an increase in the interest revenue from government bonds. As a restructuring scheme, the government injected capital into some distressed banks, and these banks received government bonds. As a result, the portfolio pattern of these banks was modified, leading to an increase in the interest revenue from government bonds.
As regards changes in the structure of expenses, the effect of the declining deposit interest rate is reflected in a drop in interest expenses. In addition, a decline in personnel expenses is apparent. Another important change is the rise in the "contribution to the Financial Institution Development Fund (FIDF)". The FIDF is an institution affiliated to the Bank of Thailand (the central bank), and it has been providing an implicit blanket guarantee for depositors of financial institutions. The contribution of banks to FIDF can be regarded as a premium for deposit insurance. The rate was raised in late 1997 from 0.1 per cent of total deposit per annum to 0.4 per cent, causing a marked increase in expenses relating to this item.
III. Analytical Framework and Data

III.1 Analytical Framework
As our analytical framework, we adopt Bresnahan's (1989) conjectural variation model of competition. Specifically, we consider a loan market in which banks face a demand function p ϵ p(Q, z), with Q = ∑ i q i i = 1, 2, …, n, where p is the lending interest rate, q i is the individual banks' loan supply, and z is the vector of exogenous factors affecting the demand for loans. In the existing empirical literature on the banking industry, there has been a controversy over whether deposits should be treated as an input or output. In line with most of the empirical studies of the degree of competition, we treat both labour and deposits as factor inputs, and loans as banks' sole output. Thus, Bank i's maximization problem is
where C(q i , ω i ) is Bank i's cost function, with ω i being the vector of the prices of its factor inputs. The first order condition is
Rearranging (2) yields (3) where MC i is the marginal cost, and η ϵ (-∂Q/ ∂p)/Q is the semi-elasticity of loan demand to the lending interest rate. θ i ϵ (∂Q/∂q i )/(Q/q i ) is Bank i's conjectural'elasticity of total loan of the banking industry with respect to its own loans, that is, Bank i's expectation on how other banks react to its output change. This term indicates the bank's market power, i.e., the extent to which the bank can manipulate the loan supply and the lending interest rate by collusion with other banks. When the market is in perfect competition, θ i takes the value of zero for all banks. Ina monopoly, θ i equals one.
There are two ways of estimating the degree of competition using equation (3). One method is to obtain θ i by identifying it separately from the semi-elasticity of demand, η. However, insofar as we assume a homogeneous loan market, we have only one observation per year for the aggregate loan demand.
8 Thus, we cannot obtain annual estimates of η, but an estimate of average semielasticity over a long period of time, so that we cannot retrieve annual estimates of θ i . The second method is to estimate θ i /η as one parameter (Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) ). In the latter case, dividing both sides of equation (3) by p, we obtain a Lerner index,
This Lerner index, L ∈ [0,1), measures the markup of price over marginal cost, indicating the market power of a bank. We estimate a crosssectional average of θ i /η for each year and derive an industry-wide average Lerner index to see how it has evolved before and after the crisis. Rearranging equation (3) yields
where R i refers to Bank i's interest income. 9 To calculate the marginal cost, we consider the following translog cost function; (5) where 1nω 1,i and 1nω 2,i stand for the deposit interest rate and wage, respectively. Differentiating (5) with respect to q i yields the following marginal cost as below:
Substituting it into (3') completes the supply equation.
As an empirical strategy, we estimate the bank's supply function (3') simultaneously with the cost function (5) on the assumption that estimating the supply function simultaneously with the cost function will improve the precision of estimation. We basically follow Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) One difference is that we add a control variable, 1n(npl i ) in the cost equation, with npl i referring to the amount of NPLs. Since the sample span includes the period of the crisis, including notably the abrupt rise in NPLs and the associated decline in the net amount of loans, this term is expected to control such shocks. Thus, the formulation of the estimation equations is as follows; (7) (8)
In equation (8), θ η / ( ) m (m = 1993, 1994, …, 2004) stands for the degree of competition for each year, from which we construct the Lerner index.
III.2 Data
Our data set covers the six largest commercial banks for the period 1992-2004. 10 We select these banks according to the following criteria: (i) banks which existed throughout the period of analysis; (ii) banks that maintained more than 3 per cent of the bank loan market share throughout the period of analysis; and (iii) banks which were not majority-owned by foreign investors. With regard to the first criterion, those banks which were liquidated or merged with other banks have been eliminated from the data set since the cost structure of these banks may differ from others due to their bad lending practice. The third criterion is based on the questionnaire survey of Okuda (2004) which showed that the target customers of the foreign-owned banks differ from those of other locally incorporated banks, and that there is possible market segmentation.
The data we employ have been derived from the annual reports of individual banks, Statistical Data on Commercial Banks in Thailand, published annually by Bangkok Bank, and Thailand's Commercial Banks, 25 November 1997 by Thai Investment and Securities Public Company Limited.
We provide the definition of variables and their descriptive statistics in Table 3 . With regard to output, we use "net earning assets", which comprise loans as well as investments. As we have seen in the last section, after the crisis, banks shifted their portfolios towards securities. Using "net loans" as the volume of output leads to an underrating of banking operations in recent years. Second, interest rates are ex post values, that is, interest incomes (expenses) divided by net earning assets (total liabilities). Therefore, the lending interest rate gets lower than the nominal ex ante lending rate when the "net earning assets" comprises unclassified NPLs, this being particularly the case in 1998-99. Third, we define the costs and the deposit interest rate in two ways. In the basic definition of the costs (C i ), we count only the interest expenditure and personnel expenses because these items are two main variable components of ordinary expenditure. In the alternative definition, given the marked increase in "contribution to FIDF" in recent years, we'include this expenditure item in the costs, (C 2i ). Accordingly, the deposit interest rate, ω R2,i , is calculated by dividing the sum of the interest costs and the contribution to FIDF with total liabilities.
IV. Estimation Results
IV.1 Results
We estimate equations (7) and (8) simultaneously by three-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions, using the pooled data of the six largest commercial banks for 1993-2004. 11 As for instrumental variables, in addition to the exogenous factor prices and the amount of NPLs, we employ the lagged variables of the terms that include q i and C i . (B) Descriptive statistics We first estimate equations (7) and (8). The estimated parameters of the cost function do not fulfil the condition of monotonicity (not reported). Considering the small sample size, we might need a more parsimonious specification of the cost equation. In fact, we test the null hypothesis that the cost equation takes the form based on the Cobb-Douglas production function, and cannot reject the null hypothesis. Accordingly, we estimate the system with the restrictive specification of the cost function as below. (8') Also, we include intercept dummies for individual banks, (k=2, 3, 4, 5, 6) , to account for possible differences in cost efficiencies. Table 4 reports the results of estimation. In general, the fit of the cost function is satisfactory. All the estimated coefficients have the expected signs. β 1 < 1 suggests economies of scale in the banking industry. With regard to the differences in cost efficiencies among banks, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of no differences. We also perform a Hausman specification test, which also is in favour of the model that includes the bank dummies. On the other hand, whether or not the contribution to FIDF is included in the costs does not much affect the results of the estimation. Thus, we put forward the analysis based on the estimation result of model (3) in Table 4 . To construct the Lerner index, we divide θ η / ( ) m for each year by an average of the ex post lending interest rates of six banks for the corresponding period. We depict the derived index in Figure 4 . As can be seen, the Lerner index swung down considerably in 1998-99. However, we do not consider this is due to intensified competition among banks. On the contrary, the low score of the Lerner index is related to nonfiled NPLs in the earning assets. As the loan classification was still loose in the late 1990s, banks had a considerable amount of non-filed NPLs on their balance sheets. Non-filed NPLs lowered the ex post lending interest rate, which resulted in the low score of the Lerner index. On the other hand, a more interesting finding from Figure 4 is the rise in the Lerner index in the postcrisis period. How can we interpret this change?
We devote the rest of the analysis to discussion of this question.
IV.2 Discussion
The rise in the Lerner index in recent years implies that, despite changes in the competitive environment of the banking industry in terms of FIGURE 4 Lerner Index NOTE: The Lerner index is calculated using the following formula: m = 1993, 1994, …, 2004. ( / ) θ η m is obtained from the estimation result (4) in Table 4 . p m is an average of the ex post lending interest rates of the six banks for the corresponding year. SOURCE: Author's calculation. 7 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 ownership structures and regulations, competition in the industry might have declined during the 2000s. In this regard, we cannot perform a statistical analysis to regress the derived Lerner index on some relevant state variables because of the shortness of the sample period. Instead, we list some points that might be related to the rise in the Lerner index. One factor that might account for the rising trend of the Lerner index is the business cycle. In the conditions of slowdown that have been evident in the economy since the financial crisis, both lending and deposit interest rates have declined markedly in recent years. Moreover, the moderate decline of the lending interest rate in relation to the deposit interest rate and the widening interest margin might be indicative of a decline in the creditworthiness of borrowers. However, a quantitative evaluation of these changes is beyond the scope of this present paper.
From the microeconomic point of view, alternative interpretations of the rising Lerner index are possible. First, it may be related to an increase in banks''perceived credit risk and thus in risk premium. In addition, the renewed regulations after the crisis require more stringent loan appraisal and, if applicable, more loan loss provisions. These would result in an increase in implicit cost of lending which is not incorporated in the Lerner index. Second, there has been a change in the composition of loans. Commercial banks put more emphasis on consumer lending in the post-crisis period. For the aggregated commercial banks, the proportion of the consumer loans in total loans has risen from 12.5 per cent (1992-95 average) to 14.6 per cent (2002-04 average). 13 The difference in credit risk profile between consumer lending and corporate lending may also lead to a rise in the implicit cost of lending. If changes in banks' perceived credit risk and in composition of loans much account for the rising Lerner index, the degree of competition may not have been declined as much.
From the perspective of bank management, one possible explanation is that the banks need to increase net interest income to make up for the losses from the disposal of NPLs. As can be seen in Figure 1 in section II, despite the rising net interest income, the return on assets still remains much lower than the pre-crisis level. Such a need to make up for the losses for all banks might have given an impetus to tacit collusion among them, resulting in a decline in the degree of competition.
V. Concluding remarks
In this article, we have estimated the degree of competition in the Thai banking industry in order to evaluate how the 1997-98 East Asian crisis and the subsequent reforms affected the structure of the banking industry. In particular, applying the method of Bresnahan's (1989) conjectural variation model, we have derived a Lerner index which measures the mark-up of price over marginal cost.
In spite of changes in the competitive environment of the banking industry in terms of ownership structures and regulations, the Lerner index showed a rising trend in the post-crisis period. During the post-crisis reforms, family ownerships in a number of banks were replaced with state and foreign ownerships. There were also new entrants to the industry, a phenomenon that had been absent for a long period. These changes may make it difficult to maintain collusion, if any, between banks. However, preliminary estimation results reveal the possibility of a decline in competition.
The estimation results appear to conform to the vision of the recently announced Financial Sector Master Plan that enhancing competition leads to increase efficiency of the banking sector. However, the present analysis is limited in the sense that we cannot perform statistical analysis on the causes of a change in the degree of competition due to the shortness of the sample period. Moreover, from the microeconomic point of view, an increase in banks''perceived credit risk and risk premium as well as a change in the composition of loans may account for much of the rise in the Lerner index. In such a case, the degree of competition may not have been declined so much as indicated by the index. It is hoped that this article encourages more empirical studies on
